http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2013/03/24/the-xi-putin-summit-china-russian-strategic-partnership-and-the-failure-of-obamas-asian-pivot/
Stephen
Harner, Contributor
The
Xi-Putin Summit, China-Russian Strategic Partnership, And The Failure Of
Obama's 'Asian Pivot'
Russia's
President Vladimir Putin (R) and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping shake hands
during their meeting in the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, on March 22, 2013.
Xi Jinping arrived today in Moscow on his first foreign trip, to cement ties
between the two countries by inking a raft of energy and investment accords.
(Image credit: AFP/Getty Images via @daylife)
A
lot of people in the State Department, the White House, and the Pentagon have
been squirming in their chairs this weekend, as persons responsible for U.S.
policy toward Asia, toward Russia, and most importantly toward China, have
listen to and read reports of the March 22 Xi Jinping-Vladimir Putin summit in
Moscow.
What
these persons—if
they are intellectually honest—must have been thinking, if
not daring to speak, is that what transpired between the leaders of China and
Russia was a great setback, if not utter disaster, for U.S. interests. It was brutally plain evidence of the folly
of the Obama/Clinton/Panetta “pivot to Asia.” It was evidence of the gross ineptitude of
the Obama administration in what many—including former U.S.
Assistance Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell,
reputably the “father
of the pivot”—have
said is and must be the highest foreign policy priority of the United
States: i.e., forging a cooperative and
constructive relationship with China.
Observers
in Tokyo were, if anything, even closer to panic after the China-Russia
summit. The results could not have been
worse from Japan’s
perspective. That the Xi-Putin summit—the
success of which, the Russians remarked, exceeded everyone’s
expectations—took
place exactly one month after Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s
short, perfunctory, cold, and largely fruitless February 22 audience with
President Obama in Washington, added insult to injury.
How
the truly historic and important Xi-Putin summit got scheduled at the same time
as Obama’s
headline grabbing trip to Israel—such that U.S. media hardly
noticed or covered it—is an intriguing topic for
investigation. Maybe it was a
coincidence, but maybe it was not. And
if not, it would have been the U.S. side that sought to divert attention
elsewhere.
For,
to repeat, Xi’s
March 22-24 official state visit—his first overseas visit
since attaining the Chinese state’s highest office–may
very well have marked the beginning of an historic, and regrettable, new and
potentially anti-American geopolitical alliance in East Asia.
So
what did China’s
and Russia’s
supreme leaders talk about and what did they do? Essentially they spoke about forming an “all
around strategic partnership” in to meld and advance the
two countries’
interests. Pointedly, they explicitly
affirmed support for each country’s strategic and territorial
interests, including claims to disputed territories. For China these include the Diaoyu (Senkaku)
islands also claimed by Japan, and islands in the South China Sea claimed by
the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam.
For Russia the territories include the four islands designated by Japan
as its “Northern
Territories”
and by Russia as the Southern Kuriles.
In
a joint press conference after their meeting, Xi and Putin emphasized that
verdicts and resolutions delivered against the “defeated
powers”
(read Japan and Germany) in WWII by the victorious powers (read Russia and
China) cannot be overturned. What these
references suggest is coordination and mutual support between Russia and China
in international dispute resolution and particularly in the United Nations
where both are permanent members of the U.N. Security Council with veto power.
Chinese
and Russian officials signed 30 agreements on cooperation in the areas of
energy, trade, technology, and military exchange. All are strategically vital and, more
importantly, irreplaceable for both countries.
In military technology in particular, Russia has proven an invaluable
and indispensable source for China against which the West, led by the U.S.,
still blocks military technology transfers.
Continued,
if not enhanced, Chinese-Russian cooperation in strategic military matters was
signaled by Xi’s
visit to Russia’s
strategic defense command headquarters and “war
room,”
the first visit allowed for any foreign leader. To ensure that the point was made, both
internationally and at home, Chinese media were allowed in to video Xi’s being
briefed while looking at computers and giant screens tracking military
intelligence targets.
One
focus of joint China-Russian military concern, pointedly mentioned in the
Xi-Putin press conference, is the U.S.’s building of an intercontinental
ballistic missile defense system that could conceivably undermine that current
strategic military balance based upon deterrence.
A
big part of the China-Russian relationship will be joint development of Russian
coal, oil, and gas resources to feed China’s
massive current and future energy requirements.
The shale gas “revolution” and
other trends in the global energy market are threatening Russia’s
present markets and revenues. Energy is
Russia’s
most strategic economic resource. The new China-Russia partnership aims to bind
the two countries in the energy field.
The
day before Abe called on Obama, on February 21, former Japanese prime minister
Mori Yoshiro was received by Putin in the Kremlin. Abe had sent Mori to Moscow to lay the
groundwork for a visit by Abe scheduled for April. We do not know what, if anything, Mori had to
say to Putin about Abe’s visit to the U.S., or
about Abe’s
announced goal of strengthening the Japan-U.S. mutual defense “alliance.” We do know that Mori and Putin touched on the
“Northern
Territories”
issue, and that Putin hinted—using the judo term for a “draw”
(hikiwake)—at
some opening for a settlement if Japan would accept reversion of perhaps two of
the four islands. (A Russian proposal to
this effect was previously made in the 1950s but rejected by Japan.)
When
Abe gets to Moscow he will be aiming, like Xi, to acquire for Japanese
interests long term agreements on energy development and purchase. Russia should be motivated, but to the extent
resources are limited, we have to wonder whether Chinese-Russian strategic
partnership has erected hurdles that will increase costs and limit access for
Japan.
What
we do know, what the Xi-Putin summit attests, is that U.S. diplomacy over the
past four years has failed to effectively engage and motivate China to chart a
course that is positive for U.S. interests.
Rather, the Obama administration’s
overly militarized and threatening “pivot”
policy, combined with pronouncements about strengthening U.S. “alliances”—relics
of the anti-Soviet Cold War and lately often subtly if not blatantly anti-China—has
provided impetus to a Chinese-Russian embrace seemingly intended as a
counterpoint to U.S. regional military hegemony and alliances, particularly the
alliance between the U.S. and Japan.
History
shows that many great geostrategic turning points are hardly recognized as such
at the time. Could it be that–as the
world was watching Obama in Israel–the Xi-Putin summit in
Moscow was one of these points?
